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INTENT IN CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY
IN NEBRASKA
INTRODUCTION
In 1948, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held in Newman v.
Christensen' that an injury occasioned by horseplay gave rise to a
cause of action in negligence rather than battery, thus affording
plaintiff a longer statute of limitations. In so doing, the court
adopted the minority definitions of both assault and battery which
require an intent to injure to be proved. This is an element of
criminal law which is usually not carried over into tort law. This
article will compare intentional tort and negligence, showing that
the "horseplay" case is and has been capable of being analyzed as a
civil battery. The article will also consider the practical differences
in liability between intentional tort and negligence, concluding that
although they might not be sufficient in Nebraska to require dis-
tinction between intentional tortious battery and negligence in
this peculiar situation, the Nebraska plaintiff is denied a legitimate
cause of action in the "horseplay" case.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY IN NEBRASKA
Newman and Christensen were playing pitch at the Elks Club
in Fremont, Nebraska. Newman swept some money from the table
onto the floor. As Christensen stooped to pick up his money, he
jokingly jerked Newman's foot upward. The chair on which New-
man was sitting spun away and he fell over backwards, striking
and allegedly injuring his back. Christensen admitted the oc-
currence, which he claimed was mere "horseplay" and pleaded that
the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.2 The
court considered several definitions of assault and battery, con-
cluding that because of the absence of an "intent to injure"3 the
case should be brought in negligence which has a longer statute of
limitations. 4
Prior to Newman the only Nebraska case defining assault and
battery was Miller v. Olander5 which defined battery as an "[i]n-
jury actually done to the person of another, in an angry, resentful,
or insolent manner."6 This language suggests that an intent to
1 149 Neb. 471, 31 N.W.2d 417 (1948).
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1943).
S 149 Neb. at 475, 31 N.W.2d at 419.
4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (1943).
5 133 Neb. 762, 277 N.W. 72 (1938).
6 Id. at 765, 277 N.W. at 73.
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injure is an element of civil battery since injury done to another
in an angry manner would indicate an intent to do bodily injury.
It seems more appropriate, however, to speak of an "intent to in-
jure" in relation to criminal actions since a man-injuring mens rea
is an element in both criminal assault and battery.7
Nebraska is not alone in requiring an intent to injure in civil
battery. The court in the principal case cited and discussed Perkins
v. Stein & Co.,s which based its definition of battery on Bishop on
Criminal Law.9 The court in Perkins considered the intent to
injure as the essence of assault, and required an evil intent for
battery,'0 concluding: "We are therefore prepared to say that to
constitute an assault and battery... the act complained of must
be done with hostile intent."" Donner v. Graap12 was cited in
Newman, for the proposition that a battery is an intentional tort
embodying elements of criminal intent. Ott v. Great Northern Ry.
Co.,' 3 was cited as holding that "[A] battery ... is an action
founded upon an intentionally administered injury to the person-
such an injury as could be made the basis of a criminal prosecu-
tion.' 4 The remaining case cited in Newman was Razor v. Kiney'5
which also required an intent to injure another as a factor in civil
battery. These decisions were cited from jurisdictions following the
minority position requiring criminal intent in civil assault and bat-
tery. None of these cases cited involved a "horseplay" situation.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY DEFINED
Requiring an intent to injure in civil assault and battery is
inconsistent with the law elsewhere.' 6 Cooley states:
[A]n action for assault and battery must be based upon willful and
intentional acts, as distinguished from mere negligence, but in civil,
as distinguished from criminal assaults and batteries, an actual
7 Byrn, Assault, Battery and Maiming in New York: From Common Law
Origins to Enlightened Revision, 34 FoRDHAm L. REv. 613 (1966).
8 94 Ky. 433, 22 S.W. 649 (1893).
9 2 J. BIsHoP, NEw ComiWNTAuIms ON THE CmanAL LAw § 72c (8th ed.
1892).
10 94 Ky. at 437, 22 S.W. at 650.
1" Id.
12 134 Wis. 523, 115 N.W. 125 (1908).
1s 70 Minn. 50, 72 N.W. 833 (1897).
14 Id. at 54 72 N.W. at 834.
'5 55 l. App. 605 (1894).
16 See Recent Decisions, 23 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 352, 355 (1949), where the
author, speaking of the principal case, states: "[T]here is a dearth of
respectable authority to support the position taken."
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intent to injure is not an essential element .... It is not essential
that the precise injury which was done should have been de-
signed.17
According to the Restatement of Torts, 8 a person's intent to cause
harmful or offensive contact creates liability in civil assault and
battery. Prosser states that the only intent required is the in-
tent to bring about unpermitted contact.19 The defense of "horse-
play" has not traditionally relieved defendants from liability in
civil battery.20 Prosser's statement is the prevailing view of the
case law.21 In Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co.,2 2 the defendant,
aware that such result might occur, deliberately drove his truck on
a narrow road, striking plaintiff's automobile which had pulled off
the traveled portion of the road to let the truck pass. The court
found an intent to injure necessary in civil battery although this
17 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1932)
(footnotes omitted); cf. 1 F. HARPER & 'F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 3.3 (1956).
18 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
19 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (3d ed. 1964).
20 Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958) (high school students threw
chalk and erasers at one another in sport, hitting plaintiff, a non-
participant); Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
(a boy pulled a chair away just as plaintiff was about to sit down);
Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N.E. 484 (1902) (defendant
grabbed the arm of a friend who had a hold of plaintiff, the force of
the motion knocking plaintiff down); Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130,
26 Am. R. 81 (1877) (involved boys playing, one throwing mortar at
the other as he ran away, hitting the latter in the eye); Markley v.
Whitman, 95 Mich. 236, 54 N.W. 763 (1893) (plaintiff, a nonparticipant
in the game in which defendant was engaged, was given a push by
defendant); Fitzgerald v. Cavin, 110 Mass. 153 (1872) (in a friendly
scuffle, defendant went beyond the limits to implied consent and
squeezed plaintiff's testicles).
21 Vosberg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891) (defendant in jest
kicked plaintiff in the leg during a session of school); accord, Lutter-
man v. Romney, 143 Ia. 233, 121 N.W. 1040 (1909) (defendant injured
plaintiff while trying to obtain sexual intercourse with her); Morrow
v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1949) (defendant shot a pistol at one
person, missed and hit plaintiff, a stranger); Rullis v. Jacobi, 79 N.J.
Super. Ct. 525, 192 A.2d 186 (1963) (defendant grabbed plaintiff's arm
while objecting to the removal of a fence); Baldinger v. Banks, 26
Misc. 2d 1086, 201 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1960) (defendant playfully pushed
plaintiff, a little girl, to discourage her from playing with defendant
and others); Nichols v. Colwell, 113 Ill. App. 219 (1903) (defendant
engaged plaintiff in a "friendly scuffle").
22 207 Or. 34, 293 P.2d 717 (1956) (defendant collided his truck with the
car of plaintiff). The court said there was no difference between
hitting plaintiff with one's fist or with one's car if the act was in fact
a battery.
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injury was legal, not physical in nature-a violation of a protected
right to freedom from unpermitted contact. The court further
held that one charging civil battery need only allege intent to
bring about the unpermitted contact.
Where an operation is performed without plaintiff's consent, it
is considered unnecessary to show that the defendant intended to
injure the plaintiff to state a cause of action in civil battery.23
In Johnson v. McConnel, 24 the defendant, in attempting to stop a
scuffle between plaintiff (who was drunk) and another, broke the
plaintiff's leg. He was held liable by the court although he was
acting in the plaintiff's best interest. Where defendant set a broken
bone despite plaintiff's protestations that she wanted a doctor, the
action was found to be a battery even though the defendant was
motivated by the best of intentions.2 5
Two necessary elements for a tortious battery can be culled
from these cases. There must only be an intent to do the act, and
absence of consent on the part of the injured party. Terms such as
"hostile intent" and "intent to injure" are not found to be ele-
ments of civil battery. The definition is an interference with
plaintiff's bodily integrity causing an unpermitted contact by the
actor, who intends such contact. The defendant in Newman in-
tended to jerk plaintiff's foot which, according to the definitions
above, is sufficient to create liability in civil battery.
An intent to injure is required only for criminal assault. To
constitute tortious assault, there must be an apprehension on the
part of the plaintiff of an immediate harmful or offensive touching
of his person, caused by one intending to create such apprehension.
26
An apparent intent and an apparent present ability to commit a
battery are sufficient for civil assault.2 7 Thus, where the defend-
23 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); cf. Annot., 26
A.L.R. 1036 (1923), on the liability of doctors in assault and battery.
24 115 Hun. 293 (N.Y. 1878).
25 Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, 14 N.J. Super. Ct. 390,
82 A.2d 458 (1951).
26 Carpenter, Intentional Invasion of Interest of Personality, 13 ORE.
L. REV. 227 (1934); Perkins, AnAnalysis of Assault and Attempts to
Assault, 47 M1nn. L. REV. 71 (1962); Byrn, Assault, Battery and Maim-
ing in New York: From Common Law Origins to Enlightened Revi-
sions, 34 FORDHA L. REV. 613 (1966); Turner, Assault at Common Law,
7 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 56 (1939).
27 Howell v. Winters, 58 Wash. 436, 108 P. 1077 (1910); accord, Newell v.
Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 38 Am. R. 703 (1880). Contra, Degenhardt v.
Heller, 93 Wis. 662, 68 N.W.- 411 (1896). Wisconsin is in the anamolous
position of requiring intent to injure in tortious assault, but not in tor-
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ant points a gun at plaintiff in a threatening manner, this would
constitute an assault.2 All that is necessary is an intentional act
on the part of the defendant reasonably calculated to create appre-
hension of a present battery, and a fear that the defendant might
go further and commit a battery upon plaintiff's person.29  The
commonly accepted criminal definition of assault is found in Bur-
ton v. State:30 "An assault is an attempt or offer with force and
violence to do a corporal injury to another, whether from malice
or wantonness, under such circumstances as denote a present in-
tention of doing it, coupled with the present ability." Today many
authorities agree that the definition of criminal assault has come to
mean an attempted battery done for the purpose of harming plain-
tiff, while tortious assault means an intentional act placing an-
other in apprehension of receiving an immediate battery, but not
requiring the intent to injure.31 Thus although the better view
sees an intent to injure as characteristic of a criminal assault and
completely unnecessary for a tortious assault, the Nebraska rule
requires an intent to injure in both tortious battery and assault.
A battery can roughly be equated to a striking or touching,
but underlying many batteries is an assault which may exist inde-
tious battery; cf. Vosberg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891) for
a Wisconsin case involving civil battery.
28 Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872); accord, 6 Am. JuR. 2d,
Assault and Battery § 28 (1963); cf. Oshogay v. Schultz, 257 Wis. 323,
43 N.W.2d 485 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
29 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 32 (1965); accord, Rollins, Torts:
Assault and Battery, 17 NOTRE DAViE L. REv. 2, 17 (1941); Langford v.
Shu, 285 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962); Turner, Assault at Common
Law, 7 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 56 (1939).
30 8 Ala. App. 295, 62 So. 394 (1913); accord, State v. Jones, 18 Del. 573,
47 A. 1006 (1900); State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S.E. 544 (1904);
Bodeman v. State, Tex. Crim. App., 40 S.W. 981 (1897); Berkley v.
Commonwealth, 88 Va. 1017, 14 S.E. 916 (1892); State v. Hatfield, 48
W. Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900).
31 One of the earliest definitions of assault is found in 2 W. HAWKINs, A
TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 16 (7th ed. 1795): "An attempt
or offer, with force and violence to do a corporal hurt to another." The
use of assault in its criminal sense is achieved by analyzing Hawkins'
use of the words "attempt or offer" as necessarily implying a purpose,
and if the words are so employed in the definition, it necessarily fol-
lows that there can be no criminal assault without a definite purpose
to harm the plaintiff. Keigwin, Is an Intent to Do Harm Requisite to
a Criminal Assault? 17 GEo. L.J. 56 (1928); accord, Perkins, An Analy-
sis of Assault and Attempts to Assault, 47 MiN. L. REV. 71 (1962); 1
R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 154 (Ander-
son ed. 1957); 1 W. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 135 (1946); M.
WINGERSEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIvES (CLARK & MARSHALL)
§ 4.08 (6th ed. 1958).
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pendently. Defendant's conduct may and frequently does, include
both assault and battery, but even where defendant's attempt to
inflict a battery is successful, an assault is not necessarily present.
A battery may be inflicted upon the plaintiff before he has time to
be placed in apprehension. 2 Some jurisdictions have confused the
two torts, probably for historical reasons.3 3  Originally, both
battery and assault were pleaded in the action of trespass, an
action that was semi-criminal in nature because the defendant had
to pay a fine for breaching the King's peace.34 Because both
assault and battery were "breaches of the King's peace," they are
comparable except for the different character of the invasion of
plaintiff's interests. For these reasons a court's use of the term
"assault and battery" should be analyzed with care to insure that
in fact both torts were present.
INTENTIONAL TORT AND NEGLIGENCE
Nebraska's use of the minority definition of battery, requiring
an intent to injure, shows awareness of the fact that in most cases
involving tortious battery or assault, the defendant's act is moti-
vated by a desire to do bodily injury. To require the plaintiff to
prove such intent as an element of the tort is thus not considered
to be an inequitable burden in jurisdictions following this position.
The problem in applying the Nebraska rule arises where the court
is faced with the "practical joke" or '"horseplay" case, for when the
rule is applied to this situation, as in Newman, there is no basis
for implying this intent to injure. Since the defendant was not
motivated by an intent to injure, the minority courts will turn to
negligence lest there be no remedy for this tort. The author feels
that the minority thesis falters at this point because it fails to deal
effectively with defendant's intentional action, as found in New-
man, where an intent to engage in unpermitted physical contact is
clearly shown. This rule produces an illogical limitation on the
scope of the interest protected-the right to freedom from unper-
mitted contact. Because of this position, Nebraska lawyers may
have hesitated to place their faith in the law of intentional tort,
thus denying plaintiff a legitimate cause of action.
It is axiomatic then that negligence is unintentional whereas
assault and battery are both intentional. In negligence, a person
32 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (3d ed. 1964). Thus
in civil assault, apprehension on the part of the plaintiff is essential.
33 Some courts have referred to battery as an "assault," Mailand v. Mail-
and, 83 Minn. 453, 86 N.W. 445 (1901).
34 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tmm LAw OF TORTS § 7 (3d ed. 1964); Wood-
bine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 34 YALE L.J. 343, 359 (1925).
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who acts necessarily creates a risk to others, and it is only when this
risk becomes excessive is liability for negligence imposed. Since
public policy requires certain activities to be carried on, tort law
recognizes a privilege to act as long as the acts are not dispropor-
tionate to the desired or protected interests of society.3 5 The
measure of what acts are disproportionate to the interests of society
is the "prudent man" standard. In the principal case, the defend-
ant was not culpable nor did he intend to injure the plaintiff, but
the defendant's action was not that of a "prudent man" according
to the Newman court, which then concluded that the defendant
must have been negligent.36
Tortious battery, however, includes those acts which a person
does when he knows with substantial certainty that they must re-
sult in an invasion of plaintiff's right to freedom from unpermitted
contact.3 The courts have attempted to draw the line of demarca-
tion between intentional torts and negligence at the point where
the risk ceases to be merely foreseeable by a reasonable man and
becomes an apparent certainty.38 The risk of harm in intentional
battery is inherent in the very act itself. Public policy thus pro-
hibits these activities because of the intentional invasion of the
protected interest without regard to any privileged conduct that
attends an inquiry into negligence. There is no public interest
in allowing one person to intentionally jerk another's foot whether
it is done only as a practical joke, or with the worst intentions,
because of the apparent certainty of harm.
The Nebraska rule suggests that if the injury is not intended,
the act is negligent. 39 Unintended harm, however, does not change
an intentional act into a negligent one. Where the act involves
the intentional touching of another, the actor is liable in civil
battery for the resulting unintended bodily harm.40 That such con-
sequences actually resulting could not reasonably have been fore-
35 Seavy, Principles of Torts, 22 NEB. L. BULL. 177, 190 (1934).
36 149 Neb. at 476, 31 N.W.2d at 420; Brief for Appellee at 15, Newman
v. Christensen, 149 Neb. 471, 31 N.W.2d 417 (1948).
37 Carpenter, Intentional Invasion of Interest of Personality, 13 ORE. L.
REV. 227, 234 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter].
38 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 13, Comment d, & § 21 (1934); accord, Garratt
v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), where a boy who
pulled away a chair just as plaintiff was about to sit down was held
liable for battery because he knew that she was substantially certain
to suffer a forcible seating on the ground.
39 Newman v. Christensen, 149 Neb. 471, 31 N.W.2d 417 (1948).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16(1) (1964); accord, Vosberg v.
Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891); Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co.,
207 Ore. 34, 293 P.2d 717 (1956).
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seen is immaterial. 41  Since the defendant is liable for such in-
juries as directly result from his wrongful act, whether or not they
could be foreseen by him, it would seem that plaintiff need only
allege an intentional, unprivileged contact with his person and re-
sulting damages to prove civil battery.42
Requiring plaintiff to show negligence in a situation where
intent to engage in unpermitted contact is clearly shown, unduly
restricts plaintiff since liability in negligence can be much more
limited than it is in civil battery. Only when defendant can rea-
sonably foresee that such contact is likely to result and that it in-
volves an unreasonable risk is such an act negligence. 43  Negligent
liability is also more difficult to prove. It is a jury question whether
or not the defendant has met the standard of reasonable conduct, a
standard not considered in tortious assault and battery.44 Plaintiff
in negligence must show that defendant owed a duty of care
generally, which when violated, might foreseeably result in harm to
someone,45 and then show that his injury was proximately caused
by defendant. 40 Causation is not usually a consideration in inten-
tional torts, liability being closely akin to absolute liability when
imposed.47 Punitive damages are often imposed on defendant in
intentional torts.
Punitive damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the
full compensation for his injuries, for the purpose of punishing and
discouraging possible repetition as well as for deterring others.48
Such damages are allowed where the defendant's action has been
41 Id.
42 Lutterman v. Romney, 143 Iowa 233, 121 N.W. 1040 (1909); accord, Vos-
berg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891); Baldinger v. Banks,
26 Misc. 2d 1086, 201 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1960); F. JAMEs, CIvM PROCEDURE
§ 2.9 (1965).
43 Carpenter, supra note 37.
44 Russel v. Electric Garage Co., 90 Neb. 719, 134 N.W. 253 (1912); Walter
v. Village of Exeter, 87 Neb. 125, 126 N.W. 868 (1910); City of Omaha
v. Houlihan, 72 Neb. 326, 100 N.W. 415 (1904); Spears v. Chicago B. &
Q. Ry., 43 Neb. 720, 62 N.W. 68 (1895).
45 Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting opinion).
40 Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937) aff'd on re-
hearing, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938); Hanford v. Omaha & C.B.
St. Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643 (1925).
47 Vold, The Legal Allocation of Risk in Assault, Battery and Imprison-
ment-The Prima Facie Case, 17 NF_. L. BuLL. 152, 164 (1938); Smith,
Tort and Absolute Liability, 30 HARv. L. REv. 241 (1917); Bauer, The
Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 586.
48 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 2 (3d ed. 1964).
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intentional and deliberate, and occasionally where the defendant
has been grossly negligent.49 But the doctrine of punitive or ex-
emplary damages has been repudiated in Nebraska. 50 The Ne-
braska courts have held that fines deterring the defendant from
future intentionally tortious conduct belong to the criminal courts
since punishment and deterrence are objectives of criminal law,51
and yet, as shown above, there is little difference between the civil
and criminal definitions of assault and battery in Nebraska. Sec-
ondly, the state constitution gives all "penalties" and "fines" aris-
ing from the law of the state to the school board.5 2 It is arguable
that any damages in addition to compensation for injury would
be such a penalty.53 Financially then, the result in dollars of either
civil battery or negligence would be the same to the plaintiff
since in Nebraska the measure of recovery in all civil actions is com-
pensation for the injury sustained. A court's reluctance to consider
the nicer distinctions of tort law is more comprehensible in this
light. Some jurisdictions, however, consider punitive damages as
extra compensation for injured feelings or sense of outrage rather
than punishment. The courts in these jurisdictions allow these
damages to enlarge compensatory allowance, but do not consider
them as authorizing a separate sum by way of example or punish-
ment.
54
49 Id.
50 Bee Publishing Co. v. World Publishing Co., 59 Neb. 713, 82 N.W. 28
(1900); Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881); Winkler
v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N.W. 607 (1888).
5' Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68, 30 Am. R. 814 (1878).
52 NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
53 Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960) where it was
held that a statute imposing treble damages in a civil suit for fraud
violated the constitutional provision in question.
There are other statutory problems in Nebraska. The statutory
definition of criminal assault and battery is: "Whoever unlawfully
assaults, or threatens another in a menacing manner, or unlawfully
strikes or wounds another. . . ." NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-411 (Reissue
1948). There is little difference between this definition and that found
in Miller v. Olander, 133 Neb. 762, 277 N.W. 72 (1938). The author
feels that the materials reviewed by the court in the principal
case, were not sufficient to differentiate between tortious battery and
criminal battery. Considering this along with the court's obvious de-
sire to get around the statute of limitations problem, the result reached
is not too difficult to understand.
54 Michigan and New Hampshire courts have utilized this approach in
order to bring the concept of punitive damages within the theory of
compensatory damages. See, Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876);
Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
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CONCLUSION
The requirement of an intent to injure imposed by the Ne-
braska rule is due to the adoption of the minority definition of
battery requiring an intent to injure, which confuses the required
intent in tortious battery with the requirement for criminal law,
although the better view today is that the defendant need only in-
tend to inflict the unpermitted contact. In cases where such in-
tent does not exist, the plaintiff has the more difficult burden of
proving negligence. The problem could be eliminated by confin-
ing the term "battery" to instances where the defendant has in-
tentionally invaded the plaintiff's right to freedom from harmful
and offensive touching, leaving unintentional invasions to the neg-
ligence field. "Assault" should be clarified by restricting it to those
situations where the defendant puts the plaintiff in apprehension
of such a harmful or offensive touching. An intent to injure should
not be an added element of proof which the plaintiff has to sustain
in a civil battery or assault. Although the concept of negligence
could be broadened to cover the "horseplay" case where the intent
to injure is not a consideration, it would be conceptually and prac-
tically sounder to allow the cause of action in terms of intentional
tort.
Ronald J. Dolan '68
